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Priming of Depth-Rotated Objects
Depends on Attention
and Part Changes
Volker Thoma1 and Jules Davidoff2
1University of East London, UK, 2Goldsmiths University of London, UK
Abstract. Three priming experiments investigated the role of attention and view changes when common objects were rotated
in depth. Objects were shown in prime-probe trial pairs. Experiment 1 extended findings by Stankiewicz, Hummel, and
Cooper (1998) showing that attended objects primed themselves in the same but not in a reflected view, whereas ignored
objects only primed themselves in the same view. In Experiment 2, depth-rotations produced changes in the visible part
structure between prime and probe view of an object. Priming after depth-rotation was more reduced for attended objects
than for ignored objects. Experiment 3 showed that other depth rotations that did not change the perceived part structure
revealed a priming pattern similar to that in Experiment 1, with equivalent reduction in priming for attended and ignored
objects. These data indicate that recognition of attended objects is mediated by a part-based (analytic) representation together
with a view-based (holistic) representation, whereas ignored images are recognized in a strictly view-dependent fashion.
Keywords: attention, object recognition, priming, structural description, representation, view-dependency
Introduction
A single 3D object can be encountered from a number
of viewpoints each producing a potentially unique 2D
projection. How important are these views for object
recognition? Many researchers have shown that for
common objects recognition performance reliably
drops with rotations from a familiar or trained view-
point and argued that recognition was view-dependent
both in the picture plane (e.g., Jolicouer, 1985;
McMullen & Jolicoeur, 1990, 1992; Murray, 1998,
1999; Murray, Jolicoeur, McMullen, & Ingleton,
1993) and in depth (e.g., Hayward, 1998; Lawson &
Humphreys, 1996, 1998; Lawson, Humphreys, & Joli-
coeur, 2000). View-point dependent effects have also
been obtained with novel objects rotated in the picture
plane (e.g., Tarr & Pinker, 1989, 1990) and in depth
(e.g., Bulthoff & Edelman, 1992; Hayward & Tarr,
1997; Tarr, 1995; Willems & Wagemans, 2001). In
consequence view-based (or image-based) theories
(e.g., Bülthoff & Edelman, 1992; Edelman & Intrator,
2003; Poggio & Edelman, 1990; Tarr & Bülthoff,
1995; Tarr & Pinker, 1989) propose that we recognize
objects by matching their images to specific holistic
views in long-term memory). However, not all object
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recognition is viewpoint-dependent. Biederman and
his colleagues have obtained view-invariant effects af-
ter image transformations such as translation (Bieder-
man & Cooper, 1991a), scaling (Biederman & Coo-
per, 1992), left-right (i. e., mirror) reflection (Bieder-
man & Cooper, 1991b), and some rotations in depth
(Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993).
Viewpoint invariant recognition is usually ac-
counted for by theories that propose part-based repre-
sentations (e.g., Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Bieder-
man, 1992; Marr & Nishihara, 1978; Palmer, 1977).
According to this approach the visual system repre-
sents objects as structural descriptions, which specify
an object’s parts, such as generalized cylinders
(Marr & Nishihara, 1978) or geons (Biederman,
1987), in terms of their spatial relations to one an-
other. For example, a structural description would re-
present the shape of a coffee mug as a “curved cylin-
der” (i. e., the handle) “side-attached” to a “vertical
straight cylinder” (i. e., the body, see Biederman,
1987). This description does not specify Ð and there-
fore is not affected by Ð the distance and angle from
which the mug is viewed (an exception are “acciden-
tal” views, which occlude parts and project volumetric
parts as 2D forms). Consistent with the structural de-
32 V. Thoma & J. Davidoff: Priming of Depth-Rotated Objects
scription account of shape perception, there is evi-
dence that the visual system represents the relations
among an object’s parts both explicitly (Hummel &
Stankiewicz, 1996; Palmer, 1978; Tversky & Hemen-
way, 1984) and independently of the parts themselves
(Saiki & Hummel, 1998).
There are properties of object perception, however,
that are inconsistent with the concept of structural rep-
resentations. First, to construct structural descriptions,
object recognition would require attention and time
to bind parts and spatial relations (e.g., Hummel &
Biederman, 1992). However, there is behavioral evi-
dence (e.g., Intraub, 1981) as well as evidence from
single-unit recording (e.g., Oram & Perrett, 1992) that
indicate that object recognition can operate faster than
structural representations would allow (see Hummel,
2001). Second, object recognition can occur without
attention. For example, studies have demonstrated that
ignored images prime a subsequent corresponding
probe in both negative (e.g., Tipper, 1985; Treisman &
DeSchepper, 1996) and positive priming paradigms
(Thoma, Hummel, & Davidoff, 2004; Stankiewicz
et al., 1998; Stankiewicz & Hummel, 2002).
Thus, there is evidence for properties indicating
both view-based and structural representations but
neither of them seems sufficient to explain human ob-
ject recognition. Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996;
Hummel, 2001) proposed a model in which objects
are recognized on the basis of a hybrid representation
of shape, consisting of a holistic (i. e., “view”-like)
representation working in parallel with an analytic
representation (i. e., a structural description). Unlike a
structural description, the holistic representation does
not specify an object’s parts or their spatial relations
independent of each other. Instead, object’s parts are
represented in terms of their topological positions in
a 2-D coordinate system. This representation is sensi-
tive to many variations in viewpoint (such as rotations
in the picture plane and substantial rotations in depth)
but it is invariant with some changes (such as location
in the visual field and with scale). The holistic repre-
sentation therefore permits rapid, automatic recogni-
tion of familiar objects in familiar views (because it
does not require visual attention to bind parts and cat-
egorical spatial relations), but allows little generaliza-
tion to novel views or to novel exemplars of known
categories. The analytic representation, in contrast,
codes an object’s shape explicitly in terms of the cate-
gorical interrelations among its parts. This representa-
tion is largely robust to many variations in viewpoint
(such as translation, changes in scale, left-right reflec-
tion and some rotations in depth) but it, too, is sensi-
tive to rotations in the picture plane (if categorical
spatial relations are changed, see Hummel & Bieder-
man, 1992). Furthermore, it also allows generalization
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across metric variations in object shape, generaliza-
tion to novel views and to novel exemplars of known
categories, reflecting the desirable properties of a
structural description. However, it requires processing
time and visual attention to represent parts and spatial
relations independent of each other.
According to the hybrid holistic/analytic model, at-
tending to an object’s image activates (and therefore
visually primes) both a structural description of the
object’s shape and a holistic (i. e., view-like) represen-
tation of its shape. Ignoring an image activates the
holistic representation of its shape but not the struc-
tural description. The hybrid model therefore allows
novel predictions for the relationship between visual
attention and visual priming as a function of variations
in viewpoint and other manipulations of an object’s
image. In general, it predicts that visual priming for
attended images should reflect the properties of both
representations, whereas priming for ignored images
should reflect the properties of the holistic representa-
tion alone.
The predictions have been tested and confirmed by
Stankiewicz et al. (1998) and Thoma et al. (2004). As
predicted by the model attended images visually
primed themselves, left-right reflected and configur-
ally distorted (split into two displaced halves) versions
of themselves, whereas ignored images visually
primed only themselves but not their mirror reflec-
tions or distorted images. Moreover, the priming ad-
vantage for same view prime-probe pairs over left-
right reflected or configurally distorted image pairs
was equivalent in both attended and unattended condi-
tions (about 50 ms) indicating two independent com-
ponents. Taken together with previous studies these
findings show that the hybrid model can account for a
large number of properties in object recognition while
providing novel predictions concerning the effects of
viewpoint and attention. However, one area in which
the model has not yet been tested is rotation in depth
(i. e., about the y-axis). These rotations usually affect
recognition performance and priming across views
(for a review, see Lawson, 1999) but the underlying
representations and processes are not clear. Bieder-
man and Cooper (1991b) originally demonstrated the
involvement of geons in object recognition by show-
ing that deletion of geon-critical contours (e.g., verti-
ces) have a more detrimental effect on recognition
than equal amounts of other contour-deletions. In sup-
port of the structural description account, Biederman
and Gerhardstein (1993) showed that substantial rota-
tions around the z-axis did not significantly diminish
priming for geon-based objects, except for rotations
which revealed new geons or occluded previously seen
parts. However, Tarr, Williams, Hayward, and Gau-
thier (1998) have demonstrated that even single geons
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(which are by definition represented in a view-inde-
pendent fashion) incur performance costs after depth
rotations in both naming and matching tasks (but see
Biederman, 2000). Moreover, Lawson and Humphreys
(1998) reported view-dependent priming effects even
after depth rotations of only 10∞ (with a delay of sev-
eral minutes between prime and probe display). Pre-
viously, Lawson and Humphreys (1996) have also
shown that view-specificity was reduced with long
(2,510 ms, vs. short: 585 ms) interstimulus intervals
between prime and probe.
The hybrid theory of object recognition may offer
an explanation for the qualitative and metric effects of
depth-rotation without making any further assump-
tions. As with mirror-reflections (Stankiewicz et al.,
1998), substantial depth-rotations should produce a
view that is significantly different from the holistic
representation of the original view. This should lead
to a reduction in priming compared to seeing an object
in exactly the same view. Therefore, unlike geon the-
ory, the hybrid model would predict that any substan-
tial change in depth orientation from prime to probe
trial in a short-term priming (or sequential matching)
paradigm should result in recognition costs; this is be-
cause the holistic representation will always be af-
fected regardless of whether or not part changes occur.
Thus, the model can potentially account for the results
of studies that found recognition costs for matching
depth-rotated objects (Hayward & Tarr, 1997; Law-
son & Humphreys, 1996; Tarr et al., 1998). At the
same time, the hybrid model would also predict addi-
tional reductions in priming for attended objects after
depth-rotations if parts are revealed or occluded be-
tween depth-rotated views. According to the model,
units representing parts (and their spatial relations)
fire maximally on repeated presentation of an object
when activated by the same visible parts but less so if
parts are missing or new parts are visible. If the
number (or type) of visible parts of an object is
changed after depth-rotations, then there should be a
larger reduction in priming between the attended con-
ditions (reduction in analytic and holistic activation
after depth-rotation) relative to the ignored conditions
(reduction only in holistic activation after depth-rota-
tion). In other words, for depth-rotations involving
part changes the hybrid model would predict an in-
teraction between attention and view. This study aims
to explore whether the predictions derived from the
hybrid model can account for priming patterns of
attended and ignored objects that are presented in the
identical view or rotated in depth between prime and
probe view.
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Experiment 1: Priming for
Mirror Images
The primary goal of this experiment was to replicate
the findings of Stankiewicz et al. (1998) in which mir-
ror images were found to prime their original version
in the attended conditions, but not in ignored condi-
tions. Mirror images can be considered as depth-rota-
tions if the object has an axis of symmetry that can
be aligned with the line of sight, which was the case
for most of the objects in this experiment (48 out of
56). The basic procedure followed the paradigm of
Stankiewicz et al. (1998). Briefly presented prime dis-
plays contained images of two objects, one to the left
and one to the right of fixation. One object was pre-
cued with a square box in its location (attended
prime), and the subject’s task was to name the object
that appeared within the cueing square; the other (un-
cued) prime object was to be ignored. Immediately
following the prime objects a probe display presented
a single image at fixation, which again had to be
named.
A novel set of objects was used consisting of grey-
level images which were produced by rendering com-
puter generated 3D objects (see Figure 1). The result-
ing images were near photorealistic and allowed to
investigate whether the findings of priming found for
black-and-white line drawings as employed in previ-
ous experiments (Stankiewicz et al., 1998; Thoma
et al., 2004) generalize to ecologically more plausible
images. According to the predictions of the hybrid
model (Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996; Hummel,
2001) and the findings of Stankiewicz et al. (1998)
attended images prime themselves and mirror-reflec-
tions, but ignored images only prime themselves, not
their reflected versions. The effects of view and atten-
tion are predicted to be additive: The reduced priming
component resulting from the view change should be
equivalent for both attended and ignored images.
Method
Participants
Twenty-eight native English speakers with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision participated for pay or for
credit in introductory psychology courses at Gold-
smiths College University of London.
Material
Fifty-six common everyday objects were used (see Ap-
pendix). The objects were obtained from various open
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sources on the internet in 3D Max (Autodesk) format.
Each object was oriented in a standard 0∞ orientation, in
which the main axis of elongation and/or the symmetry
axis coincided with the line of sight. An object was then
rotated slightly between 5∞ and 10∞ in azimuth to give it
a more canonical view (Blanz, Tarr, & Bulthoff, 1999)
as if the observer’s vantage point was slightly elevated.
Each object was then rotated 30∞, 60∞, and 90∞ in depth
from the standard view. All objects were rendered in 3D
Max Studio (R3) using a 25∞ field of view, which gave
an impression of perspective without drastically chang-
ing the perceived relative size of objects’ parts. The ob-
jects were surface rendered with overhead lighting but
without cast shadows. The size of the images was then
standardized. In Experiment 1, objects were only shown
in the 60∞ viewpoint and their mirror reflection (see Fig-
ure 1) which was equivalent to a 120∞ rotation in depth.
The objects were counterbalanced across partici-
pants by placing each object in one of fourteen clus-
ters of four objects. Each object from one cluster
served as prime or probe object (or both in non-base-
line conditions) in one of six conditions (attended-
same, attended-rotated, ignored-same, ignored-rotated,
unprimed-same view and unprimed-rotated view).
Thus, an object appeared in only one trial-pair for a
given participant, and all objects appeared equally
often in each condition as a probe, an ignored prime
or an attended prime.
Procedure
The ordering of the trials and the pairing of attended
and ignored objects on prime trials were randomized
for each participant. After reading and paraphrasing
the instructions, the participant read the names of the
objects on the screen and then received 12 practice
trials. Each experimental trial began with an unfilled
circle (subtending 0.032∞ of visual angle) in the centre
of the screen that was removed by the participant’s
key-press and was replaced with a fixation cross for
495 ms. Participants then saw a white screen briefly
Figure 1. Examples of objects shown in Experiment 1.
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for 30 ms followed by an attentional cuing square
(4.57∞ ¥ 4.57∞) either to the left or right of the fixation
cross at a distance of 4.0∞. After 75 ms, images of two
different objects were displayed simultaneously on the
computer screen for 120 ms; one object was inside the
square (the attended image) and the second (ignored)
object on the other side of the fixation cross (see Fig-
ure 2). Both images were centered 4.0∞ from the fixa-
tion cross. The entire prime display lasted less than
200 ms, a duration that is too short to allow a saccade
to either object. After the images disappeared, a 30-
ms blank screen was shown followed by a random-line
pattern mask displayed for 495 ms covering the entire
screen (15.6∞ of visual angle). Participants named the
cued (attended) object as quickly and as accurately as
possible. Latencies were recorded by the computer
through a voice key attached to a microphone.
After the mask, a blank screen was displayed for
1,995 ms followed by a fixation cross (0.032∞) dis-
played for 495 ms. Following a 30-ms blank screen,
the probe image was shown in the centre of the screen
for 150 ms. In total, 3,015 ms elapsed between the end
of the prime display and the beginning of the probe
display (495 ms for the prime mask, 1,995 ms for the
blank screen, 495 ms for the probe fixation dot and
30 ms blank). Following the probe display, a single
pattern mask (4.57∞) was shown in the centre of the
screen for 495 ms. The probe object was either iden-
tical to the attended object (attended conditions), the
ignored object (ignored conditions), or it was a third
object not seen previously in the experiment (un-
primed baseline condition). Half of the probe images
were shown in the view identical to the corresponding
prime object and half in the depth-rotated view. The
participant’s task was to name the probe as quickly and
as accurately as possible, after which a display with
the names of the attended prime and the probe along
with the probe response time appeared. At the end of
each trial, the experimenter recorded the participant’s
accuracy on the prime and probe displays, and all
voice key errors. The participant then could initiate
the next trial with a key press.
A departure from Stan-
kiewicz et al. (1998) was
that immediately after the
last trial participants were
asked if they had been able
to identify the to-be-ig-
nored object and if so
whether they could name
it. This was done to estab-
lish whether the partici-
pants were following the
instructions or if they were
paying attention to the ig-
nored (uncued) objects.
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Precue
Ready Signal
Fixation Signal
Prime
Image
Prime Mask
Fixation Signal
Probe Display
Probe Mask
Prime
Response
Probe
Response
Feedback
195 ms
~ 3s
Pause
Helicopter
800 ms
Car
Figure 2. Sequence of displays in Experiments 1Ð3.
Results
Trials on which either the prime or probe responses
were incorrect were excluded from the analysis of lat-
encies (18.6%) as were voice key errors (6.1%). For
all conditions, priming was calculated as the differ-
ence between each participant’s mean latency in the
unprimed (baseline) condition and the participant’s
mean latency in each of the other probe conditions
(see Figure 3).
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A 2 (Attention: attended vs. ignored) ¥ 2 (View:
same view vs. reflected view) within-subjects ANOVA
was performed on priming latencies. The analysis re-
vealed a reliable main effect of attention, F(1, 27) =
42.92, p  .001 and a main effect of rotation,
F(1, 27) = 4.77, p  .05. The interaction between atten-
tion and rotation was not reliable, F(1, 27)  1 (see
Figure 3). A Friedman ANOVA on probe errors re-
vealed no significant effect, Chi Sqr. (3) = 2.56,
p  .46.
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Table 1. Mean response times (RT, in ms), standard errors, and percentage errors for probe objects Experiment 1.
Attended Ignored Unprimed
Variable Same Reflected Same Reflected Same Reflected
RT 630 671 769 814 835 799
SE 20 23 23 22 32 30
% errors 5 6 10 11 4 4
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Attended Ignored
Pr
im
in
g 
(m
s)
Same
Reflected
Figure 3. Priming means in ms and standard errors for Experiment 1 as a function of whether the object was
attended or ignored in the prime display and whether the probe objects were presented in the same orientation
or in a mirror-reflected view (n = 28).
Matched pairs t tests showed priming reliably
greater than zero in the attended-same, t(27) = 7.93,
p  .001; attended-reflected condition, t(27) = 5.37,
p  .001; and ignored-same condition, t(27) = 2.41,
p  .05, but not in the ignored-reflected condition,
t(27)  1, p  .05. Thus, attended images in the
prime display primed the probe image in both the
same and the reflected view but ignored images
primed the probe object only when it was presented
in the same view.
An additional ANOVA on priming RTs was per-
formed excluding the 8 objects that were not strictly
symmetrical and consequently whose mirror-reflected
views were not equivalent to a 120∞ depth-rotation (e.g.,
boot, desk, etc.). As with the complete set, there was a
reliable main effect of attention, F(1, 27) = 31.02,
p  .001 and a main effect of rotation, F(1, 27) = 4.37,
p  .05, but no reliable interaction, F(1, 27)  1.
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The last trial was immediately followed by the
question of whether the participant had recognized the
ignored object in the prime display. Twenty-six ob-
servers responded with “no”; two responded with
“yes”, but could not name the object correctly.
Discussion
Experiment 1 replicated the results of Stankiewicz
et al. (1998) that attended objects prime both them-
selves and their reflected versions, whereas ignored
objects only prime themselves but not their mirror
versions. The effects of attention and viewpoint were
additive, meaning that the advantage for same versus
reflected images was equivalent in both the attended
and ignored conditions. These results are in line with
other studies finding visual priming for ignored ob-
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jects (Stankiewicz & Hummel, 2002; Thoma et al.,
2004; Tipper, 1985) and showing an advantage for
same views over mirror images (Lawson & Hum-
phreys, 1996; Stankiewicz et al., 1998).
The results obtained with this stimulus set are re-
markable because they almost exactly replicate the
findings of Stankiewizc et al. (1998) which were ob-
tained with line drawings. Thus, grey-shaded images
of computer-generated common objects and line
drawings by an artist (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980)
yield the same priming effects, implying the possible
involvement of edge-based representations (encoding
parts derived from vertices and contours, e.g., geons)
in object recognition. Edge-based approaches (Hum-
mel & Biederman, 1992; Lowe, 1987), have been crit-
icized (Sanocki, Bowyer, Heath, & Sarkar, 1998) be-
cause in many studies or simulations their proponents
mainly use line-drawings that contain no ambiguous
contours or edges (e.g., resulting from shading and
highlights) as compared to real objects (or pho-
tographs). Although Experiment 1 is not a direct test
of whether the more realistic computer-generated
grey-level images and the idealized line-drawings are
treated equally by the visual system, the findings de-
monstrate that the priming patterns found in previous
experiments are not limited to the use of line draw-
ings.
There is an alternative explanation of the additive
priming effects, which is that there is no qualitative
difference between priming for attended and ignored
items but that unattended items simply show less
priming than attended ones, which is further reduced
to baseline after a view-change. However, not all ex-
periments of this type produce the additive pattern and
so the alternative interpretation is challenged by re-
cent studies. In two experiments Stankiewicz and
Hummel (2002) showed that priming for ignored
images is invariant with view changes such as transla-
tion and scale. Thus, ignored stimuli can allow prim-
ing after some changes. At the same time ignored
stimuli do not always prime even their own identical
images Ð providing further evidence against the alter-
native interpretation. Thoma et al. (2004; Experi-
ment 3) found that while attended split objects primed
their identical split image as much as attended intact
images primed themselves, ignored split images did
not prime themselves (intact images did prime them-
selves). This result is in line with the hybrid model as
a split object has no stored holistic representation un-
less it was previously attended and encoded (for more
details on the locus of priming see Thoma et al, 2004).
Thus, the alternative hypothesis of additive priming
pattern (attended-primes-more and same-image-
primes-more) has been refuted in three published ex-
periments. Further (though more indirect) evidence of
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two qualitatively different object representations
comes from another variation of the priming paradigm
gauging the involvement of semantic and visual prim-
ing components.
In the present experiments, recognition and naming
were confounded in the attended conditions because
participants had to name the cued (attended) object as
well as the following probe object. Thus, not all the
priming in the attended condition is visual Ð the ob-
served priming will contain a semantic or name com-
ponent, as well as a component for visual priming but
it is likely that the visual priming component is the
larger (Bruce, Carson, Burton, & Ellis, 2000). Previ-
ous studies (e.g., Biederman & Cooper, 1991b) esti-
mated visual priming by substituting the image in the
identical conditions (e.g., “grand piano”) with a dif-
ferent object (e.g., “upright piano”) that had the same
basic-level name (“piano”). These “same-name-dif-
ferent-exemplars” produced no priming in the ignored
condition, and significantly less priming than re-
flected (Stankiewicz et al., 1998) or split (Thoma
et al., 2004) images in the attended-changed condi-
tions. In both studies subtracting the priming for dif-
ferent exemplars from mirror-reflected (or split) ob-
jects of the same shape produced a conservative esti-
mate of a visual priming component of about 80 ms,
reflecting the visual priming derived from an analytic
representation. As Experiment 1 replicates both the
priming pattern of Stankiewicz at al. (1998, Experi-
ment 1) and Thoma et al. (2004, Experiment 1), it is
reasonable to assume that the priming found in the
attended conditions in the current experiment con-
tained a significant and large visual component (note
that absolute priming levels were also almost identical
across these studies).
Experiment 2: Priming for Depth-
Rotated Objects with Part Changes
In previous studies (and in Experiment 1) the hybrid
model was tested by manipulating only the holistic
properties of an image: Reflecting or splitting an im-
age was predicted to affect only the holistic compo-
nent; the analytic component should not be affected
because the same parts were visible between prime
and probe displays. Within the hybrid model, the dif-
ferences in priming between the same and the mirror
views reflect the missing priming component from the
holistic representation after view changes. In conse-
quence, Experiment 1 showed that the effects of view-
point and attention are additive.
In contrast to mirror reflections, rotations in depth
between study and test can affect the analytic repre-
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sentation because visible parts may be occluded or
new parts may be revealed (Biederman & Ger-
hardstein, 1993). Depth-rotations different from those
in Experiment 1 should therefore provide an opportu-
nity to further test the theory that two representations
work in parallel because depth rotation may affect
both representational components (analytic and holis-
tic) instead of just one (holistic). The aim of Experi-
ment 2 is to test whether depth-rotation involving part
changes affects priming for attended objects (analytic
plus holistic representation) more than for ignored ob-
jects (holistic representation only). The logic of the
experiment is in three parts: First, according to the
hybrid model, all viewpoint changes (except transla-
tion and scaling) should affect the holistic component.
Second, because the holistic representation works with
and without attention, changes in viewpoint by depth-
rotations should equally decrease the amount of prim-
ing in both attended and ignored conditions compared
to priming in the identical viewpoint. Third, depth-
rotations that affect the perceived part structure of an
object should additionally reduce the amount of prim-
ing for attended images (because only then the ana-
lytic representation will be affected), but not for ig-
nored images. In summary, if a part-based representa-
tion is involved for attended images but not for ig-
nored ones, object rotations involving part changes
should affect priming for attended images (holistic
and analytic change) more than for ignored images
(holistic change only).
In Experiment 2, objects were rotated in depth to
produce an altered part-structure between views.
However, the degree of part change is not always sys-
tematically related to the degree of angular rotation
for both natural (Lawson, 1999) and novel objects
(Willems & Wagemans, 2001). For example, Figure 4
shows a camel in three different views rotated in
depth. Although in 4b the camel is shown rotated fur-
ther away from view 4a than from view 4c, it shares
a b c
Figure 4. Three views of an example object as used in the pilot study for Experiment 2. View b (termed +30∞)
is rotated further away Ð with an angular separation 90∞ Ð from view a (termed -60∞) than from view c (termed
+90∞) Ð with an angular separation of 60∞, but view b shares more visible parts with view a, because two of
the legs are hidden in view c, but the tail is now visible.
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more visible parts with view 4a, because two of the
legs are hidden in view c, while at the same time we
can now see a “new” part Ð the tail. In 4c the camel is
shown in an accidental view (Biederman, 1987; Blanz
et al., 1999): It is a complete side view that occludes
parts of an object or makes the extraction of parts
more difficult. The criterion for an accidental view is
that small changes in orientation produce considerable
changes in the part structure (Biederman & Ger-
hardstein, 1993). This applies to complete side views
because slight rotations would reveal new parts or new
contours and surfaces of parts.
To achieve a qualitative change in view orientation,
objects in Experiment 2 were depicted in two views.
One was a complete side view (or “planar” view,
Blanz et al., 1999) that would be primed by a more
conventional (depth-rotated view) or vice versa. Srini-
vas (1995) used a similar logic to create “part-oc-
cluded” objects. The effect of part-change was investi-
gated in a pilot study.
Method
Participants
Twenty-eight native English speakers with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision participated for credit in
introductory psychology courses at Goldsmiths Col-
lege University of London.
Materials
A pilot study was conducted to test whether the pairs
of +30∞ and +90 views (Figure 4b and 4c) produced
perceived part changes. To assess if these two views
of objects differ qualitatively from each other in their
39V. Thoma & J. Davidoff: Priming of Depth-Rotated Objects
part structure compared to other pairs of depth-rotated
views a rating study was conducted. Seven indepen-
dent observers from the Goldsmiths College student
community were shown 87 objects in two pairs of
views each on a computer screen. Three views were
constructed by rotating an object -60∞, +30∞, and
+90∞ (views a, b, c in Figure 4) from a standard frontal
view where the axis of elongation or the symmetry
axis of the object coincides with the viewing direction
of the observer (line of sight). The participants had to
compare 2 view-pairs of an object. They saw an object
in the -60∞ versus the +30∞ view in one trial as well
as in the +30∞ versus the +90∞ view in another trial.
The task of the observers was to indicate whether cru-
cial parts of an object were visible only in one of the
two views (by pressing the “P” key for “part change”)
or whether the two views basically depicted the same
parts (by pressing the “S” key for “same “part struc-
ture”). To provide the participants with a scale of what
is meant by a part they were introduced to the concept
of parts and corresponding objects by using Bieder-
man’s (1987) illustration of geons and geon-based ob-
jects. The order of trial (view-pair) presentation was
completely randomized. Participants had as long as
they wished to press the “P” key if they thought there
was a part change or the “S” key if the same parts
were visible in both views.
For the subset of the objects used in Experiment 1,
two one-way ANOVAs on the factor View-pair were
performed, first with objects and then participants as
random factor. The factor levels were the two types of
view-pairs separated by depth-rotation (-60∞ and +30∞
vs. +30∞ and +90∞) with the number of “P” (i. e., part
change) responses as dependent variable. An ANOVA
with participants as random factor revealed a main
effect of type of View, F(1, 6) = 26.35, p  .01, as did
the ANOVA over items, F(1, 86) = 49.07, p  .001.
Thus, objects shown in the +30∞ and +90∞ view pair
were perceived to exhibit more part changes (mean
4.11, SE .29) across the two views than when shown
in the -60∞ and +30∞ view pair (mean 1.91, SE .26).
The priming experiment used the same 56 objects
as in Experiment 1. Prime objects were depicted in
two different views counterbalanced across two partic-
ipant groups: Objects in group 1 were shown in an
orientation rotated +90∞ off the line of sight in prime
displays, and then shown in the same view or rotated
+30∞ off the line of sight in probe displays, and vice
versa for group 2. As in Experiment 1, the objects
were counterbalanced across participants so that each
object would serve in each condition equally often.
The general set-up of the experiment was the same as
in Experiment 1.
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Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, ex-
cept that participants were not asked whether they rec-
ognized the ignored image in the last trial. There were
six priming conditions (attended-same, attended-ro-
tated, ignored-same, ignored-rotated, unprimed-same
view and unprimed-rotated view) in which each of the
objects appeared equally often.
Results
In Figure 5 the priming results of Experiment 2 are
given as savings in response times relative to the base-
line (unprimed) condition. Trials on which either the
prime or the probe responses were incorrect were ex-
cluded from the statistical analysis of latencies
(20.2%), as were voice key errors (4.1%). The base-
line latencies for each of the two probe views were
866 ms (SE 38.5) for the 30∞ probe view and 857 ms
(SE 27.7) for the 90∞ probe view (collapsed over
groups).
For all conditions, priming was calculated as the
difference between each participant’s mean response
time in the relevant baseline (unprimed) condition and
the participant’s mean response times in each of the
corresponding priming conditions. A 2 (Group: prime
view 30∞ vs. 90∞) ¥ 2 (Attention: attended vs. ignored)
¥ 2 (View: same vs. rotated) mixed analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) revealed no reliable effect of group
(i. e., the two orientations primed their corresponding
probe equivalently), F(1, 26)  1, a reliable main ef-
fect of attention, F(1, 26) = 47.15, p  .001, and view,
F(1, 26) = 8.37, p  .001. The only significant in-
teraction was between attention and view, F(1, 26) =
5.04, p  .05. The difference between the attended-
same and attended-rotated conditions (collapsed over
groups) was statistically reliable, t(27) = 3.73, p 
.001, but not the difference between the ignored-same
and ignored-rotated conditions, t(27) = 1.27, p  .05.
A Friedman ANOVA on probe errors for each priming
condition revealed no significant effects, Chi Sqr.
(3) = 1.48, p  .68).
Matched pairs t tests were conducted on each prim-
ing condition to determine which type of prime dis-
play caused savings in response time for the probe
display. Priming was reliably greater than zero in the
attended-same condition, t(27) = 7.78, p  .001;
attended-rotated condition, t(27) = 4.00, p  .001; and
ignored-same condition, t(27) = 2.95, p  .01, but not
in the ignored-rotated condition, t(27) = 1.37, p  .05.
Attended images in the prime display primed the
probe image in both the same and rotated view, but
ignored images primed the probe object only when
presented in the same view.
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Figure 5. Priming means in ms and standard errors for Experiment 2 as a function of whether the object was
attended or ignored in the prime display and whether the probe objects were presented in the same orientation
or in a depth-rotated (60∞) view (n = 28).
Table 2. Mean response times (RT, in ms), standard errors, and percentage errors for probe objects Experiment 2.
Attended Ignored Unprimed
Variable Same Reflected Same Reflected Same Reflected
RT 644 708 810 783 899 824
SE 22 26 28 27 37 27
% errors 7 5 8 9 5 5
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicate the previous
findings of priming for attended images in the same
view and in a changed (here: depth-rotated) orienta-
tion while ignored objects only primed themselves in
the same view. Unlike previous tests of the hybrid
model, the data show an interaction between attention
and view-change: The difference between identical
and depth-rotated views was significantly greater for
attended than for ignored images. This novel priming
pattern is in line with the prediction of the hybrid
model that depth-rotations may cause qualitative
changes in analytic representations that depend on at-
tention.
The priming observed for images repeated in the
same view was slightly higher in Experiment 2 then in
Experiment 1. This is probably due to longer response
times for unprimed stimuli, which are likely to be a
consequence of Experiment 2 using views (in particu-
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lar the 30∞ orientation) that were slightly less canoni-
cal then the ones used in Experiment 1 (see Blanz
et al., 1999). These views take longer to recognize and
may profit more from priming (see, e.g., Rensink,
2000). Interestingly, priming for unattended rotated
objects is now also greater than zero. Although this
amount of priming is insignificant, it indicates that
the non-additive priming pattern is not just due to a
floor effect for ignored images. The difference be-
tween ignored images is still ~50 ms, but could have
been greater if priming for changed views was zero.
Rather, the interaction effect was solely due to the re-
duction between attended primes (presumably the ana-
lytic component), as predicted by the model.
The priming effects obtained in Experiment 2 can-
not be attributed to difficulties with the objects’ spe-
cific orientation in depth. The present experiment, as
well as other studies (e.g., Hayward, 1998), show that
planar views (here: +90∞) prime themselves as much
as other non-planar (canonical) views. The observa-
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tion that part changes such as occlusion account for
the striking priming differences in the attended condi-
tions is also supported by the findings of Srinivas
(1995; Experiment 2). She manipulated part changes
across depth-rotations in a similar way (selecting
views in which parts of photographed objects were
occluded by other parts). Srinivas’s participants were
shown objects rotated in depth (67∞, 130∞, and a part-
occlusion rotation) for 300 ms in the prime display.
Matching object identity did not affect latencies in the
view conditions with all parts visible but increased
response times in the part-occluded condition.
The finding that depth-rotations affect priming dif-
ferences for rotated attended objects more than in ig-
nored conditions confirms the prediction of the hybrid
model that two qualitatively different representations
are employed. Most current view-based accounts do
not specify the role of attention and therefore could
not have predicted the results described here. How-
ever, if attention plays a role in matching representa-
tions based on metric properties, one would expect
enhanced priming effects for rotated objects in
attended conditions relative to ignored conditions be-
cause attention would serve to aid the matching pro-
cess (e.g., Olshausen, Anderson, & van Essen, 1993).
The results also do not fit entirely with theories
proposing structural descriptions. These accounts
would not have predicted priming in the ignored route
because structural descriptions rely on attention to
actively bind local features into parts and then parts
and relations to objects (see Hummel & Biederman,
1992). However, the results for depth-rotations in the
attended conditions are in line with structural descrip-
tion accounts. They would have predicted larger prim-
ing costs obtained for rotations that cause part
changes compared to mirror reflected views (Bieder-
man & Gerhardstein, 1993). Rotations resulting in
part changes will alter the activation pattern of a struc-
tural representation between prime and probe view,
which means a reduction in priming compared to ex-
actly the same parts being visible in both events (e.g.,
in mirror images). Experiment 3 investigates priming
effects for depth-rotations (other than mirror-reflec-
tions) that do not affect visible parts.
Experiment 3: Priming for
Depth-Rotated Objects without
Part Changes
Experiment 2 showed that depth-rotations that produce
part-changes incurred greater priming costs for pre-
viously attended versus ignored objects but it remains
to be shown that this is not the case for any other depth
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rotation. Thus, Experiment 2 was designed to test
whether the priming pattern observed for mirror images
(Experiment 1; Stankiewicz et al., 1998) can be repli-
cated with depth-rotated views in which the same parts
are visible. The critical assumption is that depth-rotated
objectsÐ likemirror imagesÐ can be shown in orienta-
tions that reveal equivalent part structures but differ
substantially in their metric (holistic) similarity.
In Experiment 3 there was a greater degree of an-
gular separation (90∞) between the prime and probe
view than in Experiment 2 (60∞) but the view-pairs
were rated as more similar (in terms of shared parts)
than the view-pairs of Experiment 2. The two views
used were “off-axis”, that is they are shown in orienta-
tions that do not fall in the line of sight or perpendicu-
lar to it. These “canonical” views have been found
to be the easiest to recognize (Boutsen, Lamberts, &
Verfaillie, 1998; Palmer, Rosch, & Chase, 1981) and
are often rated as the most typical views in which
objects appear (Blanz et al., 1999; Palmer et al., 1981;
Verfaillie & Boutsen, 1995). Objects were bilaterally
symmetric such that a rotation across the line of sight
produced a view in which roughly the same parts are
visible (see Figure 4a and 4b).
The predictions from the hybrid model of Hummel
(2001) are that viewpoint and attention produce addi-
tive effects of priming for qualitatively similar views.
The analytic representation should not be affected by
depth rotations that do not substantially change the
part structure, which means that its contribution
towards overall priming remains equivalent between
the identical and the depth-rotated view. In contrast,
the holistic representation should change considerably
due to the depth-rotation, because different surfaces of
the same object project to different units in the holistic
surface map. Its contribution to priming should go
towards zero.
Method
Participants
Forty native English speakers with normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision participated for credit in in-
troductory psychology courses at Goldsmiths College
University of London.
Materials
A set of 84 objects was used (see Appendix). All ob-
jects were shown in two standard views (see Figure
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4a and 4b). These were separated by 90∞ rotation
around the y-axis from each other: The two views
were created by rotating objects +30∞ (i. e., one of the
views in Experiment 2) and -60∞ (the standard view
of Experiment 1) from the line of sight (i. e., the line
of symmetry). Of the 84 objects, 30 objects were used
as target objects, and the rest were used as filler items
(i. e., in unprobed conditions). This design was used
to reduce the error rates and to boost the statistical
power (see Stankiewicz & Hummel, 2002). The target
objects were placed into 5 subsets which appeared
equally often across participants in all conditions
(attended-identical, attended-rotated, ignored-iden-
tical, ignored-rotated, and unprimed). The filler items
appeared randomly in one of the conditions as un-
probed prime object (either attended or ignored). The
two standard views for probe displays were counter-
balanced across 2 groups (-60∞ in group 1, and +30∞
in group 2). The prime objects were displayed in
either one of the two views depending on the experi-
mental condition (same view vs. rotated) and in-
termixed in the unprimed (baseline) condition.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2, ex-
cept that the probe object in each group of participants
was always depicted in the same general orientation
and the prime object was either in the same orientation
or rotated.
Results
Trials on which either the prime or probe responses
were incorrect were excluded from statistical analysis
(7.92%), as were voice key errors (3.83%). The laten-
cies for the baseline probe views were similar in both
groups: 770 ms (SE 31.8; for the -60∞ orientation) and
803 ms (SE 29.7, for 30∞ orientation), a non-signifi-
cant difference, t(38)  1. Figure 5 shows the priming
results of Experiment 3 as savings in response times
Table 3. Mean response times (RT, in ms), standard
errors, and percentage errors for probe objects Experi-
ment 3.
Attended Ignored Unprimed
Variable Same Reflected Same Reflected
RT 601 627 726 770 790
SE 13 14 16 16 22
% errors 2 2 3 2 3
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relative to the baseline (unprimed) condition (see also
Table 3).
A 2 (Group: probe view 30∞ vs. -60∞) ¥ 2(Atten-
tion: attended vs. ignored) ¥ 2 (View: same vs. ro-
tated) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed
no reliable effect of group (i. e., priming patterns in
the two probe orientation groups did not differ),
F(1, 38)  1, a reliable main effect of attention,
F(1, 38) = 105.13, p  .001, and view, F(1, 38) =
10.79, p  .01. There was no statistically reliable in-
teraction. A Friedman ANOVA on probe errors re-
vealed no significant effects, Chi Sqr. (3) = 1.50,
p  .68.
Matched pairs t tests were conducted on each prim-
ing condition (collapsed over groups) to determine re-
liable savings in response time compared to the base-
line. Priming was reliably greater than zero in the
attended-same condition, t(39) = 8.61, p  .001;
attended-rotated condition, t(39) = 7.93, p  .001; and
ignored-same condition, t(39) = 3.47, p  .01, but not
in the ignored-rotated condition, t(39)  1. Probe
images were successfully primed by attended images
in the prime display shown in both the same and ro-
tated view, but ignored images primed the probe im-
age only when presented in the same view. The differ-
ence between the attended-same and attended-rotated
conditions was statistically reliable, t(39) = 2.41,
p  .05, as was the difference between the ignored-
same and ignored-rotated conditions, t(39) = 2.30,
p  .05.
An additional ANOVA was run contrasting Experi-
ment 2 and 3: The 2 (Experiment: probe view 30∞ vs.
-60∞) ¥ 2 (Attention: attended vs. ignored) ¥ 2 (View:
same vs. rotated) mixed analysis of variance
(ANOVA) revealed no reliable effect of experiment,
F(1, 66)  1, but a reliable main effect of attention,
F(1, 66) = 132.05, p  .001, and view, F(1, 66) =
18.92, p  .001. There was only one significant in-
teraction: this was the 3-way interaction between Ex-
periment ¥ Attention ¥ View, F(1, 66) = 7.05, p  .01.
The difference between attended images (same view
and rotated) was larger in Experiment 2 than in Ex-
periment 3, whereas the difference between ignored
conditions (same and rotated view) remained the same
across experiments.
Discussion
The priming pattern observed with depth-rotated ob-
jects in Experiment 3 is the same as in Experiment 1
with mirror-reflections. Probe objects were primed by
previously attended images presented in the same
view as well as in a changed (here: depth-rotated)
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Figure 6. Priming means in ms and standard errors Experiment 3 as a function of whether the object was
attended or ignored in the prime display and whether the probe objects were presented in the same orientation
or rotated in depth (n = 40).
view, whereas a probe image was only primed by an
ignored prime if it was presented in the same view.
The effects of attention and view were additive: Ob-
jects primed themselves more in the same orientation
than in a rotated view in both attended and ignored
conditions.
The results are in line with other studies employing
depth-rotations similar to the ones in Experiment 3.
Lawson and Humphreys (1996,1998) studied effects
of long-term (over several minutes) priming for line-
drawings of common objects rotated in depth. Their
results (using very similar objects) show that naming
was faster when the prime and probe object were iden-
tical relative to when they were rotated. Biederman
and Gerhardstein (1993) also used views similar to
ours in their Experiments 1 and 2. In long-term (i. e.,
several minutes) priming studies they, too, found only
slight differences for rotations ranging from 33.75∞ to
135∞ for common objects if there were no part
changes but obtained a marked reduction in priming
if different parts were visible across the study and test
view.
The priming pattern in Experiment 3 is clearly pre-
dicted by the hybrid model of object recognition be-
cause the views employed here were equivalent in part-
structure and should therefore produce additive prim-
ing effects for attention and viewpoint. When a prime
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object is attended, the holistic surface representation is
activated in parallel with the analytical part-based rep-
resentation. On subsequent presentation of the same
object in the same view, both the units coding parts and
spatial relations (i. e., the analytic representation) and
the units coding the location of object surfaces (i. e., the
holistic component) benefit from the previous pre-
sentation resulting in faster recognition. However, when
presented with the identical but depth-rotated object,
the same parts (and relations) are presented to the ana-
lytical unit, resulting in an activation (i. e., analytic
priming component) that is equivalent to that of the
identical view. At the same time, the locations of sur-
faces (if projected on a 2D grid) have changed consider-
ably after depth-rotations. Therefore, the activation
pattern of the holistic surface units is very different be-
tween prime and probe trial and no priming is predicted
from the holistic component.
General Discussion
In three experiments using a short term priming para-
digm attended and ignored objects primed themselves
in the same view, but only attended objects primed
themselves when presented in a depth-rotated (or mir-
ror-reflected) view. Ignored objects never primed their
depth-rotated images. View changes caused an equiva-
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lent reduction in priming for both attended and ig-
nored images, provided these view-changes did not
alter the perceived part structure (Experiments 1 and
3). However, if considerable part changes occur be-
tween prime and probe view, the reduction of priming
for previously attended objects is greater than for ig-
nored objects. These results indicate that attended ob-
jects are treated qualitatively different from ignored
objects as predicted by the hybrid model of object re-
cognition (Hummel, 2001). According to this model,
an analytic part-based representation mediates re-
cognition only for attended objects, whereas a holistic
representation underlies both the recognition of ig-
nored and attended images.
The present data are in accordance with previous
studies that show a consistent advantage of same-view
priming (Lawson & Humphreys, 1996; 1998) and that
priming across views is particularly reduced for planar
views (Hayward, 1998). The results for attended
images also confirm that object recognition depends
on whether the same parts are visible across views
(Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993; Srinivas, 1995).
The hybrid’s model general notion that object recogni-
tion across rotations in depth involves both an analytic
and a holistic representation is also corroborated by
Foster and Gilson (2002). They used novel 3-D objects
that were to be discriminated in matching tasks either
by a metric or a non-accidental (i. e., structural) prop-
erty. Discrimination performance after changing the
number of parts was superior to metric changes. Per-
formance dropped for changes in both structural and
view-specific features as the objects were rotated in
depth but there was no interaction between structural
and metric changes. Foster and Gilson proposed that
their results show evidence for object recognition
based on an additive relationship of two independent
representations Ð one part-based and one image-
based. Thus, although their model does not incorpo-
rate attention, the work of Foster and Gilson (2002)
concurs with the notion of a hybrid representation of
object shape.
There is also additional support for the hybrid
model from recent functional imaging studies. In a
fMRI study, Vuilleumier et al. (2002) showed that rep-
etition of images of common objects decreased activ-
ity (i. e., showed priming) in the left fusiform area in-
dependent of viewpoint (and size), whereas a view-
point-dependent decrease in activation was found in
the right fusiform area. The latter area was sensitive to
changes in orientation but not in size, which is directly
predicted by the hybrid model (Hummel, 2001) and
was confirmed in behavioral studies (Stankiewicz &
Hummel, 2002). Neuropsychological evidence also
further supports the notion of two components in ob-
ject recognition. Davidoff and Warrington (1999;
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2001) studied patients who were extremely impaired
at recognizing object parts. Nevertheless, they were
normal in naming intact objects though only when
seen in familiar views. In terms of the hybrid model,
the patients’ holistic components seemed intact, al-
lowing object recognition from familiar views,
whereas analytic components were impaired prevent-
ing recognition of object parts or from unfamiliar
views.
An alternative explanation for the effects of depth
rotation has been proposed by Hayward (1998). Hay-
ward (1998; Experiments 3 and 4) employed depth-
rotated views almost identical to the ones in Experi-
ment 2. He found that objects in planar views (which
were separated by 60∞ in depth from the study view)
were matched and named more slowly than a non-
planar view rotated 180∞ from the standard view.
These results are very similar to the present data in
the attended conditions. However, Hayward’s conclu-
sion was that not part-changes but common outline
shape was the crucial factor for object constancy
across 3D view changes. This explanation is based on
the logic that the 180∞ rotations employed dramati-
cally changed the part-structure but only marginally
varied the outline contour (because it arguably approx-
imated a mirror version of the original object). This
explanation cannot account for the data here. First, we
found an almost identical priming difference between
same and rotated (Experiment 3) and same and re-
flected (Experiment 1) views, although the two views
in Experiment 3 were rotated unevenly from the line-
off sight (30∞ and 60∞) resulting in an outline contour
that was separated by 30∞ from its exact mirror ver-
sion. Second, an “outline-similarity” account does not
fit with the priming data in the ignored conditions:
Priming reductions across views for ignored objects
in Experiment 2 were less reduced than in the attended
conditions. Third, similarity of outline shape cannot
account for other data very similar to those obtained
in Experiments 1 and 3. For example, Thoma et al.
(2004) found that split objects (with an outline con-
tour very different from their original versions) pro-
duce almost exactly the same priming pattern as mir-
ror-reflected (Stankiewicz et al., 1998) images.
Both our and Hayward’s (1998) data are not in line
with classic view-based accounts which assume a lin-
ear increase (e.g., Tarr & Pinker, 1989) or even an
accelerated increase (e.g., Poggio & Edelman, 1990)
of latencies with increased orientation changes: For
attended conditions, a 60∞ rotation in Experiment 2
produced greater priming costs than a 90∞ rotation in
Experiment 3 or even a 120∞ rotation in Experiment 1.
In addition, to the best of our knowledge, view-based
theories would also not predict priming for ignored
objects (see Olshausen et al., 1993). More important,
45V. Thoma & J. Davidoff: Priming of Depth-Rotated Objects
view-based approaches could not explain the interac-
tion of viewpoint and attention in Experiment 2. Even
if view-based accounts could be amended to include
priming for ignored objects, they could not explain
why a qualitative change in orientation affects
attended objects more than unattended ones.
The priming pattern also does not fit entirely with
structural description accounts. First, equivalent views
in Experiments 1 and 3 incurred priming costs, which
is at odds with a central claim of view-independence
(Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992).
Geon theory would not have predicted a reduction in
priming for depth-rotated objects in the attended con-
ditions (see Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993) be-
cause the two views showed very much the same part
structure and were far from accidental views. Of
course, it could be argued that every depth-rotation
changes the visibility of some parts, and may produce
spurious effects of view-dependence. However, the
fact that Experiment 3 obtained a very similar priming
pattern as Experiment 1 with mirror-images (which
by definition show exactly the same parts) make that
counterargument less than convincing. Second, struc-
tural description models would not predict priming for
ignored objects, because without attention part-based
descriptions of objects cannot be established. Finally,
structural description theories Ð like view-based ac-
counts Ð would not be able to account for the interac-
tion of attention and view observed in Experiment 2.
Although the data reported here clearly demon-
strate a qualitative difference in priming effects for
depth-rotated objects in dependence of attention, it is
not necessarily the case that this difference is due to
parts defined as geons. Future research needs to em-
ploy a stricter criterion for part changes in natural ob-
jects to establish whether the effects here are due to
representations resembling structural descriptions.
Nevertheless, the current results are clearly in line
with the notion of a hybrid analytic/holistic represen-
tation of shape.
In conclusion, the results show that priming effects
after depth-rotations show evidence of both view-spe-
cific and part-based representations, which, in turn,
depend on attention. The present study is the first to
test the hybrid model of object recognition with depth
rotations. Previous studies have shown that the model
can account for priming patterns after mirror-reflec-
tions (Stankiewicz et al, 1998), translation and scaling
(Stankiewizc & Hummel, 2002), and changes in con-
figuration (Thoma et al., 2004). Although only a lim-
ited range of rotations were chosen here for practical
and theoretical reasons, the experiments strikingly
show that the hybrid model’s complex predictions con-
cerning the interaction of different types of viewpoint
changes and attention could not be falsified. The data
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contribute to a growing body of evidence for indepen-
dent holistic (view-like) and analytic (view-insensi-
tive) representations of object shape.
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Appendix
Stimuli
Experiment 1 and 2
axe, banana, bike, boot, bus, camel, cannon, car, car-
riage, chair, coffee machine, cow, crocodile, desk, dog,
dolphin, drill, eagle, fork, glasses, guitar, hammer,
harp, helicopter, hippo, horse, hoover, iron, ironing
board, kettle, key, knife, lamp, microscope, motorbike,
phone, piano, pig, pipe, pistol, plane, shark, ship,
shoe, shovel, snail, sofa, spoon, stapler, suitcase, toi-
let, toothbrush, torch, turtle, watch, wrench
Experiment 3
Targets:
axe, bed, bike, bird, bus, camel, car, chair, cow, croco-
dile, dolphin, duck, glasses, gun, helicopter, hoover,
iron, lamp, motorbike, pipe, plane, scissors, ship,
snail, spanner, stapler, toilet, truck, turtle, watch
Fillers:
banana, baseball bat, binoculars, boot, camera, can-
non, can opener, carriage, chicken, corkscrew, cup,
desk, dog, fire extinguisher, fork, guitar, hammer,
harp, horse, ironing board, lock, microscope, pen,
phone, piano, pig, pincers, plunger, shoe, shovel,
skateboard, sofa, spoon, suitcase, tank, toothbrush
